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Tort Law in Practice: Appearance and Reality 
in Reforming Periodical Payments of Damages 
Richard Lewis* 
I. Introduction 
This chapter is distinct from almost all the others in this book and is part of a different tradition 
in tort scholarship. This is because it is founded on experience of the practical operation of 
the tort system and because it refers to empirical work which describes how that system 
operates. The other chapters are not as directly concerned with who actually pays and in 
what manner for personal injury—the most important type of tort claim as far as most 
practitioners are concerned. The conference for which this chapter was prepared exposed a 
gulf between the views of such practitioners and the particular academic discourse which 
predominated in the papers presented at the event. This gulf was brilliantly highlighted in a 
devastating after-dinner speech by Justice Ian Binnie of the Supreme Court of Canada. This 
chapter attempts to bridge the divide by setting a particular ‘emerging issue in tort law’ in its 
wider economic and political context, and reflecting on both its academic and its practical 
implications. It also outlines the basis for comparative work by noting legislation in Canada 
which is similar to that in the UK which forms the focus for this study. 
This chapter deals with the recently renewed attack upon paying damages for personal injury 
in the form of a lump sum as opposed to periodically. Almost twenty years ago the concept of 
a structured settlement was imported from North America and first used in the UK in order to 
provide continuing lifetime payments for seriously injured claimants.1 However, the idea was 
slow to develop. Proposals for a structure were easily defeated if either of the parties 
objected. To counter this, legislation has now removed the veto: taking into account the needs 
of the claimant, a judge can make a periodical payments order even if it is against the wishes 
of either or even both of the parties. The court must consider making such an order in any 
case involving future financial loss. The lump sum award is thus under attack. 
I will look at the impact of this reform on the settlement system and the bargaining power of 
the parties. The relationship between the new legislative regime and the existing approach to 
structured settlements is examined. Looking at the wider context, the article reveals that in 
this reform there was an inadequate assessment of the economic and financial factors which 
affect the payment of damages. In particular, the cost to liability insurers of changing the form 
of payment was under-estimated. Although having the greatest effect on insurers, the reform 
is in fact driven by government concern about the impact of lump sum awards upon National 
Health Service budgets in clinical negligence cases. Deferring the full payment of damages to 
later years is politically attractive, and gives the state an interest in how damages are paid. 
This interest was insufficiently acknowledged in the justifications provided for the reform, so 
that it appears to have been enacted for one set of reasons but in fact was enacted for 
another. This chapter therefore emphasises that there are sharp differences between the 
surface appearance of the legislation and the realities of tort law in practice. 
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 II. The First Judicially Approved Structure 
Traditionally damages for personal injury in the UK were always paid by means of a lump 
sum, and never a pension. It did not matter that the compensation was for losses that might 
be suffered in the future: both the monthly wage that the accident victim may have lost, and 
the continuing costs of care that would have to be met, were compensated by one large 
payment. In recent years this once-and-for-all lump sum system has been subject to 
increasing criticism. In particular, it results in much uncertainty and imposes upon a claimant 
an enormous responsibility for safeguarding the future. Inflation and the vagaries of the 
returns on investment of the lump sum can result in rapid erosion of the compensation. As a 
result, a new form of payment via a structured settlement has made limited inroads into the 
use of lump sums. In effect, such a settlement usually converts the traditional lump sum into a 
series of payments derived from an annuity and these continue to be made no matter how 
long the claimant lives. In addition, these payments can be protected against price inflation 
and are free of tax.  
These attractions of periodical payments were clearly illustrated in 1989 by the first judicially 
approved structure for a UK resident. Kelly v Dawes arose out of a tragic road accident which 
took place three years earlier. Catherine Kelly was then a 22-year-old nurse, and was a 
passenger in a car driven by her husband, Andrew, a stonemason.2 Not far from their home 
they were involved in a road accident caused entirely by the negligence of the driver of the 
other vehicle. Both drivers were killed. Catherine lost the husband she had recently married, 
and suffered catastrophic injuries herself. The judge described the effect upon her as follows: 
She was transformed from a lively young woman ... into a bedridden invalid with 
grossly impaired neurological functions, almost totally unaware of her surroundings, 
totally dependent on skilled nursing care and the devoted attention of her loving parents 
and family. Her condition will not improve for the rest of her life, in respect of which 
her life expectancy has been reduced to some 20 years. That figure is the product of a 
compromise medical view between doctors whose best guesses are on either side of the 
figure agreed.3 
In seeking damages on her behalf, Catherine’s father was keen to ensure that she would be 
looked after in a private nursing home for the rest of her life. Any money that might accrue to 
her estate upon her death was not an important consideration. Instead the major concern was 
that, given her uncertain life expectancy, the damages should be managed in order to ensure 
that, if she lived longer than the projected period, there would continue to be money to pay for 
her care. The best means of achieving this proved to be via a structure. 
The settlement provided for most of Catherine’s damages to be used to purchase an annuity 
from a life insurance company. The damages could be used in this way because there 
remained additional capital to provide a contingency fund for unexpected events. This reserve 
fund derived from the equity in Catherine’s home, and from the estate she inherited from her 
husband, including the damages for his fatal accident. The annuity purchased with the 
damages was for an ‘impaired life’. This meant that it provided a substantially higher annual 
return than a standard policy because the life insurer believed that the accident had reduced 
Catherine’s life expectancy and the payments would therefore be made over a shorter period 
of time. In fact, for rating purposes the life office treated her as thirty-five years older than she 
actually was. 
The major benefits of structuring the award were clearly revealed: the index-linked instalment 
payments were free of tax, and to last either for the rest of Catherine’s life or for ten years, 
whichever proved longer. They would therefore ensure that she could continue to be kept at a 
private nursing home even if she lived beyond her projected span of years. Based on certain 
assumptions, the monies from a lump sum settlement invested in the conventional portfolio of 
fixed interest stocks and blue-chip shares would have been exhausted within twelve years, 
whereas the monthly payments under a structure would continue to be made. In addition, 
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 Catherine’s father would not be subject to the stress of having to invest and be responsible for 
a lump sum greater than most people would encounter in their lifetime. Nor would the cost of 
obtaining investment advice have to be met. The financial advantages of the structure and the 
peace of mind it gave to the concerned relatives were clearly shown. 
Ten years after the settlement Catherine’s father spoke about his decision to seek periodical 
payments. He said: 
I wanted the certainty of knowing that money would be available for the rest of Cathy’s 
life. Looking back, the medical experts’ view on her life expectation ranged from 5–10 
years to 10–20 years. Physically, Cathy is in better shape now and if they come back 
today, they would say that she could live another 20–30 years from now. They got it 
wrong.... I have absolute peace of mind in knowing that, even if I am no longer here, 
there will still be money available for Cathy’s needs for the rest of her life.4 
III. The Need to Impose Periodical Payments 
Since Kelly there have been over 1,500 seriously-injured people who have received part of 
their compensation in the form of periodical payments.5 However, further expansion of 
structured settlements has been hindered in several ways. One difficulty has been the refusal 
by many lawyers to give proper consideration to the merits of the alternative form of payment, 
even though they might be liable for failing to do so.6 Their reluctance to investigate structures 
has partly been attributed to the innate conservatism of the legal profession,7 together with 
ignorance or misconception of what might be involved. Sometimes structures have been 
raised as a possibility only at a late stage in the proceedings, by which time the claimant and 
his or her advisors have become used to the idea of receiving a lump sum and are suspicious 
of the change in approach. As a result, in practice, structures have been examined only in a 
minority of the cases in which they could have been sought. For example, in 2001-02 the 
National Health Service (NHS) paid over 500 claims in excess of £100,000 and yet less than 
ten per cent involved a structured settlement.8 
The overall result has been that, largely through inertia, the lump sum has retained its 
dominance. A major factor in this has been the ability of either of the parties to object and 
thereby defeat with ease any proposed settlement based on periodical payments.9 It is this 
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 veto which is directly attacked by the new legislation. After lengthy consultation,10 the parties’ 
veto was removed by the Courts Act 2003 with effect from 2005.11 Taking into account the 
needs of the claimant, a judge can make a periodical payments order (PPO) even if it is 
against the wishes of both parties. If a personal injury case comes to court and involves future 
pecuniary loss, the judge has no choice but to consider making a PPO. An order can be made 
even if not requested or wanted by the parties or where they envisaged an alternative award. 
The cases affected will usually be those involving serious injury where claims for future 
earnings or the cost of care are made. Although relatively few in number, these are much 
more likely to come before a court and to be in the public eye. They are also where the 
claimant is likely to be in the most need and in the greatest danger of being under-
compensated.12 Although the court’s power to make a PPO is limited, the threat of its use 
affects the bargaining position of the parties in most major cases. 
IV. Limits on the Power to Impose Periodical 
Payments 
The power to make a PPO is limited in three particular respects. First, the power cannot be 
exercised in respect of damages for past pecuniary or non-pecuniary loss unless the parties 
agree. This means that only a minority of all claims in tort are in danger of having an order 
imposed because over 90 per cent involve only these two heads of damage and have no 
element of future loss.13 The typical claim is for a very small sum of money14 and it will 
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 continue to be disposed of by means of a lump sum. The preponderance of these small 
claims in the system is reflected in the fact that non-pecuniary loss accounts for about two-
thirds of the overall amount of damages awarded and past financial loss accounts for about a 
further quarter.15 However, these percentages change considerably in serious injury cases 
when future loss becomes much more important. For example, it has been estimated that, on 
average, 83 per cent of a claim exceeding £250,000 against the NHS comprises future loss.16 
In addition, it must be emphasised that these few serious injury cases are responsible for a 
substantial amount of the overall total of damages awarded: in 2002 insurers estimated that 
although only 1 per cent of cases resulted in a payment of £100,000 or more, they accounted 
for 32 per cent of the total compensation received by claimants.17 It is in cases involving this 
level of damages, albeit a minority of all claims, where the new rules will have the greatest 
effect. 
Second, a PPO can only be made if the continuity of payment is ‘reasonably secure’.18 
Legislation prescribes that the payments will be secure if either they are to be made by a 
government or health service body,19 or if they are protected by a compensation scheme 
which guarantees payment in the event of an insurer’s insolvency.20 In effect, this means that 
orders can be made in the overwhelming majority of personal injury claims. One exception is 
that the Motor Insurers Bureau is not covered, but it has already been able to demonstrate 
successfully to a court that it is sufficiently secure for a PPO to be made in cases in which it is 
involved.21 Those against whom questions of security will be raised include Lloyd’s 
syndicates, the medical defence organisations, offshore insurance companies, and private 
self-insured defendants. Even in these cases, a PPO can still be made and the security 
requirement met if the payments are arranged via the purchase of an annuity from a life 
insurer which is covered by the scheme guaranteeing payment in the event of insolvency. 
The third and final limitation on the power to impose periodical payments is the most 
important in practice. The power can only be exercised if the case comes to court. Even 
though cases of serious injury are more likely to come before a judge, it remains the case that 
only a minority of them do so.22 Therefore, if neither party wants periodical payments to be 
considered, they can achieve their aim by settling privately for a lump sum. No matter what 
the court might have considered to be the needs of the claimant, the parties will get their wish 
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 for a lump sum deal if they keep their negotiations behind closed doors and avoid judicial 
involvement. 
V. Exercise of the Court’s Discretion to Award 
Periodical Payments 
As noted, in any case involving future pecuniary loss the court must consider making a PPO. 
Whether it imposes such an order lies within its discretion and depends upon the particular 
facts of the case. The legislation offers only limited guidance about what might affect this 
decision. The most important consideration is the claimant’s needs.23 Only in a Practice 
Direction is the court referred to the secondary issue of whether either of the parties prefers a 
lump sum and their reasons for doing so. 
The emphasis on the claimant’s needs is novel: it is not to be found in earlier legislation 
dealing with damages. Need never affects compensation for lost earnings or pain and 
suffering, for example, although it is implicit in any assessment of housing or nursing care 
costs. Need is notoriously difficult to define,24 but focusing on it can produce a different 
perspective on an award. It contrasts with the usual objective in tort of returning the claimant 
to the pre-accident position. In particular, need requires a more detailed analysis of the 
claimant’s future than the tort system has previously attempted. 
Apart from need, the court must also have regard to the nature of any financial advice 
received by the claimant. This advice will rarely be that of the claimant’s own solicitor, 
because legislation prevents financial advice being given by those who are not authorised.25 
Instead the court will require the opinion of an independent financial advisor. This will have to 
be sought early in the proceedings because, as soon as is reasonably practicable, the court is 
required to give the parties a preliminary indication of which form of payment it considers the 
more appropriate.26 Financial intermediaries will therefore have an even more important part 
to play than they did in the past with structured settlements, for then they were often involved 
only at a late stage. The projections of these experts concerning the extent that the lump sum 
will be eroded compared to the constant value of the periodical payments will be crucial in 
determining the form of the award, and their opinion will now be given at an early stage in the 
proceedings. 
The court must also consider ‘the scale of the annual payments taking into account any 
deduction for contributory negligence’.27 One area of uncertainty is the level of damages 
below which it might not be worthwhile to move towards a periodic award because its size 
may not merit the time and trouble involved. Under the old rules the court had to be satisfied 
that a structured settlement had been considered by the parties in any case involving 
damages for future loss of £500,000 or more.28 However, for a periodical payment under the 
new rules Ministers concluded that the size of an award should not be the determining factor. 
Perhaps they had in mind the experience of the US, where structured settlements have 
become commonplace even at damages levels below £100,000. Instead of setting a 
damages threshold, therefore, the government has left the court to assess only whether 
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 arranging the award in a new form might involve disproportionate effort.29 Although in theory 
any award of future loss could therefore be paid periodically, in practice a PPO will be less 
appropriate for certain types of claim. For example, although there is nothing to prevent a 
court imposing an order no matter what the age of the claimant, the objection of an elderly 
person to being paid periodically might be expected to have more force given the shorter 
duration of the payments.30  
Another factor affecting the level at which a PPO may be made and the extent they will be 
used is that, in most serious injury cases, the claimant should be left with a contingency lump 
sum fund to meet unexpected needs. It is essential that this element of flexibility exists to 
safeguard the future, even though it is not mentioned in the legislation. There are fears that 
judges will not take it into account sufficiently.31 Capital may be needed not only to buy and 
adapt accommodation, but also to care for the claimant, for example in the event of the 
unexpected death or divorce of his or her carer spouse. Capital might also be needed if, as 
expected, care costs outpace price inflation. For structured settlements in the past, on 
average, only about half of the award was used to arrange the periodic payments. The 
remainder was accounted for by interim payments, the capital needed to discharge debts and 
pay for immediate purchases, and the contingency fund.32 Will judges take a similar 
approach? 
One area of concern with regard to when an order may be made is whether the award of 
damages is to be reduced for contributory negligence. This may not become apparent until a 
late stage in the proceedings, and yet it could be crucial in influencing the financial adviser as 
to the form of the award. If there is to be a reduction in damages, a PPO may not then be 
enough to pay the cost of the claimant’s immediate nursing needs. It might then be thought 
better to award a lump sum. Although that payment is more likely to be exhausted earlier if 
not within the tax shelter provided by periodical payments, it may be preferable for this to 
occur and for the claimant’s actual needs to be met for only a short time, rather than leaving a 
permanently inadequate source of funds to offer insufficient protection against needs which 
have yet to occur. 
VI. A Change to the Method for Assessing Damages 
Where periodical payments are thought appropriate, the court is required to make a 
fundamental change in the way that it calculates damages: instead of a ‘top-down’ approach it 
must adopt a ‘bottom-up’ approach,33 thereby focusing more precisely upon the claimant’s 
needs. 
The more familiar top-down approach begins only after arriving at the traditional lump sum. It 
then calculates the income stream which can be derived from that capital, and this can be 
used to assess whether it will meet the claimant’s annual needs. This top-down approach 
does not avoid the most serious criticisms made of lump sums: the need to forecast how long 
the payments will be required, and the rate of return, after taxation and inflation, which could 
be obtained from investment of the lump sum. In particular, the claimant’s life expectancy is 
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 usually an element in estimating how long the payments will be required. It is usually only 
after the lump sum has been calculated using these traditional methods that it is used in a 
structured settlement to transfer from the claimant to an insurer the risk of the claimant living 
beyond his or her estimated life expectancy. This is usually achieved by the liability insurer 
using the lump sum to purchase annuities from a life office to provide a stream of payments 
for as long as the claimant actually lives. Structures, therefore, usually involve only changing 
the form of payment after the parties have gone through the traditional approach and, as a 
result, they retain many of the disadvantages of the lump sum. 
By contrast, for a PPO the new legislation requires a bottom-up approach. Unlike top-down, 
this does not require the lump sum to be calculated at all. Instead, irrespective of the capital 
cost, the court assesses the periodical payments the claimant needs for the future and orders 
that they be index-linked and paid for the duration of the loss, this often being the claimant’s 
lifetime. Unlike under the traditional form of payment, it is the defendant who is burdened with 
both the risk of the investment return and the longevity of the claimant. 
Overall a complex budget for life may be needed, and there is great pressure to ‘get it right’.34 
Detailed planning of the claimant’s future is encouraged by allowing the payments to increase 
in steps, or even decrease.35 However, these variations in payment can only take place if the 
court specifies in the original order the precise dates for the changes to take effect. The court 
is encouraged to plan for a variety of factors including those affecting earnings (the claimant 
ceasing to work, or gaining a promotional increase in pay) and affecting care (loss of the 
existing gratuitous carers, or changes in the medical condition).  
The crucial difference from previous practice is that the court is not concerned with the lump 
sum cost of providing for these needs. Nor does it have to speculate for how long there will 
still be such need. Clairvoyant estimates of how long the claimant will live, for example, are 
made redundant. In addition, there is no need to speculate about the returns possible upon 
investment of a lump sum. There is no place for the ‘Ogden Tables’.36 Multipliers and discount 
rates are otiose: no multiplier is required to reflect the period of years of the loss in order to 
convert it into an immediate capital amount, and no discount rate is needed to convert the 
future stream of financial losses into a capital sum representing present day values. It is the 
defendant who must now assume liability over time for these risks. 
VII. The Impact on the Bargaining Power of the Parties 
It would be a mistake to assume that because new legislation has been passed it will 
necessarily be used in the way intended by the drafters. The legal rules provide a framework 
for bargaining between the parties, and the results can be very different from the picture of 
litigation envisaged by the black-letter lawyer. Within the shadow of the new rules it is likely 
that a number of claimants will try to take advantage of the removal of the defendant’s veto: 
they will threaten to take the case to court and burden the defendant with a PPO involving 
uncertain liabilities unless there is agreement to a higher lump sum than previously was on 
offer. Exactly the same tactic has been used to extract a larger lump sum when the power to 
award provisional damages has been in issue.  
Somewhat less successfully, insurers may also use the threat of periodical payments to 
bargain harder with a claimant who is set on receiving a lump sum, or worried about whether 
the court’s assessment of needs will correspond to his or her own. Can a judge be trusted to 
leave enough of a contingency lump sum fund to provide for unexpected events? Claimants 
may also be concerned that even an index-linked settlement may not be enough to pay for 
their future care costs. Because of these worries bargains will be struck to settle out of court. 
The experience of other countries is that these deals have undermined the power to make 
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 periodic awards to such an extent that ‘lump-sum settlements have like termites reduced the 
[periodical payments] rent system to but a hollow shell’.37 Because negotiations between the 
parties will water down the effect of the reform we can expect lump sums to be commonly 
used even in the majority of serious injury cases involving future financial losses. But the 
possibility of imposing a PPO substantially influences the bargaining position of the parties, 
and it is in that sense that all serious injury cases are affected. 
The move towards imposing an uncertain liability upon defendants is likely to strengthen the 
claimant’s hand more than that of the defendant. However, it is important to consider the 
effect of the changes upon the mechanics of making a deal. In particular, for costs purposes, 
how is it to be determined whether offers to settle made by either of the parties are 
reasonable when one of them is based on the traditional lump sum and the other is based 
partly on an assessment of the claimant’s annual needs? In complex cases there could be a 
mixture of approaches depending upon different care regimes and earnings losses. How is 
the court to assess the reasonableness of the rejection of a periodical payments offer if it is 
not based on its capital value but on wider social and family reasons? Although the Civil 
Procedure Rules specify that costs consequences follow if the court judgment is not ‘more 
advantageous’ than the other party’s offer, the Rules do not specify what may constitute an 
advantage in the context of periodical payments.38 As a result there is scope here for clever 
tactics from skilled litigators.39 It remains to be seen whether the broad discretion given to the 
court as to costs will be further used to encourage litigants to negotiate on a periodical 
payments basis. The attitude and training of the judiciary will be crucial in determining the 
long-term success of the new provisions. 
VIII. Why Costs for Insurers Will Increase 
Although insurers are faced with a variety of technical and administrative problems as a result 
of the new legislation, their main concern is the increased cost of settlements. Insurers will 
have to pay substantially more to fund a PPO than a traditional lump sum, and the 
government failed to anticipate this. The regulatory impact assessment for the legislation 
argued that the reforms ‘would not materially increase the value of claims’,40 even suggesting 
that liability insurers might save four per cent by purchasing annuities rather than using lump 
sums. This is far from the case, and the suggestion that there were savings to be made came 
as a shock to those with knowledge of the compensation industry: it was based upon 
‘spurious assumptions’.41 The policy implications of the reforms must be looked at afresh. 
To understand why the regulatory impact assessment was so very wide of the mark we must 
consider how most compensators will provide for their liability to make index-linked payments 
for an uncertain time and for an unknown total cost. Liability insurers will almost always fund 
PPOs by purchasing annuities from a life insurer. A possible alternative method open to large 
composite insurers is to self-fund the payments by using the facilities of their own life offices, 
but there is little enthusiasm for this, and in the past it was almost never done for structured 
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 settlements. Unlike insurers, public bodies such as NHS trusts are able to self-fund the 
payments from their own resources because they are able to satisfy the security requirement 
in the legislation. However, most other defendants will be forced into the annuity market to 
fund PPOs. This could prove difficult and very expensive for them because there are only a 
small number of suitable financial products available and only at a high cost. 
There are two main reasons for this difficulty and expense. First, there is little competition in 
the market to provide annuities for tort claimants. This has the effect of making quotations 
less keen than, for example, in the US where there are at least 15 annuity providers. By 
contrast, in the UK at the end of 2003 there was a real danger that there would be no life 
insurers involved at all. This would have completely undermined the planned reforms. 
Fortunately, a couple of new providers have now emerged but the market remains fragile.42 
Life insurers are deterred because few such annuities are sought, the market being of almost 
no significance compared to that for annuities for retirement pensions. There is a marked 
contrast with the £6 billion a year spent on structured settlements in the US. Another 
discouraging factor is the particular difficulty of underwriting annuities for the ‘impaired lives’ 
of many of the injured claimants. When there is only limited experience of the effect of injury 
on life expectancy, underwriting becomes far more an art than a science, and a miscalculated 
gamble can prove costly. As a result the market is limited, premiums have fluctuated widely, 
and the cost of annuities is high. Yet it remains of crucial importance to the future of PPOs, 
and the government has been urged to intervene to stabilise matters.43 
The second factor which drives up the cost of annuities is linking them to increases in the 
Retail Prices Index (RPI). This results in regulatory restrictions being imposed upon the 
providers. Life insurers are required by the Financial Services Authority to meet their solvency 
requirements by providing assets which closely match their liabilities. In practice this means 
that to fund RPI annuities they have to purchase index-linked gilts issued by the government. 
These are expensive to buy, the market for them being dominated by pension funds anxious 
to meet their own statutory obligations to obtain matching funds for their index-linked returns. 
In addition, the government has made too few of these gilts available to the market.44 
Because of the high demand and the limited provision the yields have been very low. In turn, 
this means that the RPI annuity rates offered by providers are poor value. Where the top-
down approach is used to arrange a settlement these rates make it difficult to ensure that the 
periodical payments derived from the traditional lump sum will meet all of the claimant’s 
needs. With bottom-up arrangements under a PPO, defendants can now be forced to make 
RPI linked periodical payments whatever the cost. If they do not self-fund, they will be forced 
to purchase annuities in this limited market. 
The overall result for liability insurers is that it will be much more expensive to purchase 
annuities to fund the payments under a PPO than to hand over the traditional lump sum. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the cost of these settlements has increased by as much as 
a quarter or even a third, and insurance reserves have been revised accordingly.45 One 
barrister has suggested that the PPO regime: 
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 is going to cost insurers, both directly and indirectly, a lot more money and expense to 
service these damages. I do not believe that they have, as yet, appreciated the extent of 
their troubles.46 
One case that was settled privately on an RPI basis illustrates this. If settlement had been 
based upon the traditional lump sum the multiplier would have been 29. However, funding 
RPI periodical payments in effect increased the capital sum needed to purchase the annuities 
such that the corresponding multiplier rose to 45. The cost of future financial loss therefore 
rose by 55 per cent.47 
IX. The Political Reasons for the Reform 
As we have seen, there are strong arguments to support the more widespread use of 
periodical payments. Many of these focus upon the needs of claimants and the desirability of 
providing compensation equivalent to that which has been lost. On the surface the 
government can be seen to be supporting a fairer system which helps ensure that 
compensation meets needs and is used for the purposes for which it was awarded. These are 
the only reasons for the reform listed by the Department for Constitutional Affairs in the 
guidance it provides.48 But if we look at the organisations that gave the most support to the 
new legislation we get a different picture of the reasons why it was passed. 
The Association of Personal Injury Lawyers is a claimant lawyers’ organisation, very active in 
test-case litigation and in lobbying the government. Although generally in support of periodical 
payments as a means to ensure full compensation of victims, it opposed the imposition of 
PPOs against claimants’ wishes unless there were exceptional circumstances.49 Not 
surprisingly, insurers, together with the defence organisation, the Forum of Insurance 
Lawyers, were not in favour of the reform. Nor was change sought by the intermediaries who 
arrange structured settlements. Frenkel Topping, the innovative firm responsible for arranging 
the great majority of such deals, has been influential in previous reforms. But it opposed 
PPOs on the ground that they would unduly interfere with the consensual approach. In total, 
only a bare majority (57 per cent) of respondents to the Lord Chancellor’s consultation paper 
gave an unqualified welcome to imposition. 
Instead the catalysts for the reform lay within the government itself. Although the legislation 
was the prime responsibility of the Lord Chancellor’s Department, it had no enthusiasm to 
make the change urgently. However, both the Treasury and the Department of Health were 
keen supporters of immediate action, and they were the driving forces behind the sudden 
implementation of the enabling legislation. Parliamentary time was found by inserting the 
relevant provisions, rather anomalously, into a bill dealing with criminal law and 
administration. Claimants’ interests were very much secondary to those involving public 
finance and the demands of the NHS. Far from being what they appear on the surface, the 
reforms in fact were politically driven. 
The political and economic advantages to the government of periodical payments are as 
follows. In contrast to the problems faced by liability insurers, the government bodies such as 
the Ministry of Defence and especially the NHS will make immediate gains. This is because 
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 their budgets will no longer be denuded by the loss of large capital sums paid as damages.50 
Their cash-flow will be improved because they can self-fund the periodical payments and they 
are not required to enter the expensive annuity market. It was forecast that in the first year of 
the new regime the NHS could save as much as £245 million out of the £330 million it would 
otherwise have to pay for the larger claims.51 This cash-flow saving will continue at a 
diminishing rate for 24 years until the accumulated liabilities reach, and thereafter outgrow, 
what would have been the capital sums needed to dispose of the claims entirely. That is, at 
that time not only will the good times come to an end and have to be paid for, but also there 
will be a real and increasing additional cost to the public purse. This cost may be relatively 
small in relation to the entire NHS budget, but government finances should beware of these 
contingent liabilities, especially in the light of current concern about whether we should be 
paying more to fund future pensions in general. In the past, damages awards have had 
dramatic effects upon individual heath care budgets: major capital expenditure has been 
deferred and even wards have closed. At present, health trusts in England are running at a 
deficit which soon could reach a billion pounds.52 It is not therefore surprising to find that the 
NHS has welcomed the new regime, and is much more likely than liability insurers to take 
advantage of it by forcing claimants to accept periodical payments. For many years it has self-
funded all its structured settlements, and it now self-funds all its PPOs. It refuses to buy 
annuities from outside providers. The savings in cash-flow are too good to miss.  
Although the reforms were driven by the NHS, it is important to note that clinical negligence 
comprises only a minority of claims even if the focus is confined to serious injuries. Liability 
insurers remain the predominant paymasters. The NHS was responsible for only 11 per cent 
of all personal injury claims resulting in an award of over £100,000 in 2001-02. For claims of 
this size in that year liability insurers paid out over £2.26 billion, almost six times as much as 
the NHS’s £0.4 billion.53 This statistic reveals how the emphasis has been misplaced, and 
how in this reform the NHS tail is wagging the insurance dog. In the great majority of cases it 
will be liability insurers and premium payers who will have to bear the increased costs 
resulting from the reforms, whilst in only the minority of cases, in the short-term, it will be the 
taxpayer who benefits. 
This is only one of several areas in which changes have been made which result in an 
increase in tort damages but also transfer costs from the public to the private sphere. Insurers 
have recently been made to bear the cost of the removal of legal aid and the introduction of 
conditional fees. They now pay the claimant’s costs, including the solicitor’s success fee and 
the insurance premium against the possibility of losing. Insurers also have been required to 
pay for the cost of providing social security benefits to accident victims and, more recently, for 
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 the cost of their NHS treatment.54 As a result of the present reforms they now must bear the 
brunt of further savings in public expenditure. Of course, the transfer results in a ‘stealth tax’ 
which all premium payers and, ultimately, society at large must pay. Tort law, whether made 
by judges or Parliament, has always been influenced by politics in the wider sense,55 and this 
is especially apparent in the recent and continuing struggles that are taking place over 
damages law. 
X. Canadian Comparisons 
Given the conference for which this chapter was originally prepared, it is appropriate to outline 
a Canadian context within which comparative work could be done in this area. Although 
structured settlements in Canada pre-date those in the UK, they have generated little 
academic interest.56 Following empirical research in both countries, I compared the two 
regimes in an article published some years ago,57 but present Canadian academic texts 
devote little, if any, space to the subject. This is in spite of continuing legislative efforts in 
Canadian provinces to introduce an element of compulsion into the previously consensual 
periodical payment regimes. Reflecting on these legislative changes, Frank McKellar, the 
leading structured settlement intermediary, has recently concluded that there has been ‘a 
steady regulatory drive towards mandatory court-ordered structured settlements’.58 Here is a 
major area of tort law in which ‘emerging issues’ comparable to those in the UK arise, yet 
which has not been subject to academic scrutiny. 
There are six provinces in which there is legislation which enables courts to impose PPOs 
against the wishes of at least one of the parties. These are Ontario, Manitoba, British 
Columbia, Nova Scotia, Quebec and, most recently, Alberta.59 One basis for making such an 
award is where the plaintiff requests that damages be increased to allow for the income tax 
that must be paid when the compensation is invested. The legislation then allows defendants 
to apply for an award of periodical payments, and the court may order such payment even if 
opposed by the plaintiff. The justification for this is that periodical payments are free of tax, 
and this obviates the need for damages to be grossed-up. In the UK the claimant does not 
seek such additional monies because the discount rate, in theory at least, already makes 
allowance for the tax that will be collected from the income that arises on investment of the 
damages. 
The limits on the use of PPOs vary in each province. The Quebec Civil Code makes the most 
limited provision: periodical payments can only be imposed in cases involving minors.60 
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 Manitoba61 and Nova Scotia62 make the widest provision, enabling courts to exercise the 
power in any claim for personal injury or death. An Ontario statute confines the power to 
cases in which a tax gross-up is sought.63 This is further limited in British Columbia by 
applying only to claims arising from the use of a motor vehicle, although the power can also 
be exercised in any motor vehicle case even if no gross-up is sought, provided that the 
pecuniary loss is at least $100,000.64 Regulations under a second statute in Ontario65 
similarly make special provision for motor vehicle accidents irrespective of gross-up by 
allowing a PPO if any two of the following four conditions are satisfied: the award is for more 
than $100,000, the plaintiff is aged under 18, the plaintiff has no other means to fund future 
care, and the plaintiff is not likely to manage the award in a prudent manner. 
Except in Manitoba and Nova Scotia, the power of the court to order a PPO is expressly 
prohibited if it is against the ‘best interests of the plaintiff’. Generally this is interpreted as 
giving the court a wide discretion. In British Columbia the effect has been that, subject to 
notable exceptions, the court usually defers to the wishes of the plaintiff.66 The factors applied 
by the various Canadian courts could prove instructive for any practitioner or judge in the UK 
trying to interpret the new powers to impose PPOs. 
There are obvious differences in the scope of the Canadian and UK legislation, but let us 
focus here upon the justifications for the statutes. The tax gross-up which distinguishes the 
regimes in the two countries has already been discussed. Apart from this factor it may appear 
on the surface that the legislation in both countries has been concerned primarily with 
protecting claimants. However, this chapter has exposed the limitations of such a perspective 
as far as the UK is concerned. Should a similar reservation be made concerning the 
Canadian position? On the surface there is a case for doing so because, in practice, many 
Canadian defendants find structures attractive propositions. But can we trace any concern 
about escalating medical costs and the benefits that might accrue to the state from the use of 
PPOs—factors which have so influenced developments in the UK? There is at least some 
evidence of these factors being relevant in Canada. In 2005 an Access to Justice Bill in 
Ontario proposed that for medical malpractice cases alone courts should be forced to use 
periodical payments to compensate for the cost of future care.67 By making this change the 
Ministry of Health and Long-term Care hoped to save over $12 million a year.68 Although the 
Bill failed, the subject is still under review. Overall, however, we remain unsure of the 
influences upon, and the effect of, the PPO legislation in the Canadian provinces. It is an 
‘emerging issue’ in need of further comment and analysis. 
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 XI. Conclusions 
In the UK, how important is the new judicial power to award damages in a form other than that 
sought by the parties? A former President of APIL has called it ‘perhaps the most important 
development ever relating to the law of damages’.69 Similarly, insurers have described it as:  
the most fundamental change in 150 years in the quantification of bodily injury claims 
involving continuing losses. The changes will affect not only the level of damages 
awarded but will also require a new approach to the quantification of claims.70  
It is true that the reform undermines the traditional approach to damages, first by requiring 
bottom-up assessments which focus upon claimants’ annual needs, and second by 
guaranteeing that these needs will be satisfied no matter how long the claimant actually lives 
and whatever the level of price inflation. These needs are to be met irrespective of the 
resulting lump sum cost. In addition, the parties must give early consideration to the form in 
which the damages are to be paid. A change is thus being sought not only in legal method, 
but also in the culture of personal injury practitioners. 
However, the effect of the legislation may be less profound and certainly much harder to see 
if it is hidden in the settlement system, and predominantly results only in insurers paying 
higher lump sums than otherwise would be the case. There is every incentive for insurers to 
settle privately in this way in order to avoid the cost and difficulty of arranging the annuity 
payments usually required to satisfy a PPO. The legislation failed to anticipate the problems 
insurers have in accommodating the new regime within their wider financial world. Because of 
the difficulties insurers will be keen to maintain the traditional form of settlement. Even if this 
proves to be the case, it can still be argued that the reform is important because all serious 
injury cases are affected by the threat of imposition of a PPO, whether or not they eventually 
come to court. The potential exercise of the power generally strengthens the claimant’s hand 
and affects the bargains that are struck in the tort system.  
In one way or another, therefore, the changes will result in many seriously injured claimants 
obtaining more money at the expense of insurance companies. But also to benefit from the 
legislation is one group of defendants—government departments and public bodies, 
especially the NHS. Unlike insurers, they can self-fund the periodical payments and thereby 
retain within their budgets the capital sums they would otherwise have to pay. They can avoid 
paying for today’s liabilities until tomorrow. This effect upon public expenditure was not 
among the main reasons put forward for the reform. However, in exposing the true costs and 
benefits of the legislation, this chapter has revealed a political dimension which could easily 
be overlooked by the casual observer. 
In spite of their importance, these changes have been implemented without apparent 
detection by academics. Tort scholarship is very partial. It is extraordinary how much attention 
is focused upon issues of liability as opposed to the quantum of damages. Practitioners are 
bemused by the pre-occupation of academics with the rules on fault: they are aware that 
liability is infrequently challenged by insurers—being raised as a preliminary issue in only 
about 20 per cent of their cases71 – whereas the amount of compensation is almost always 
open to some negotiation. This chapter goes a little way towards redressing the imbalance in 
tort scholarship. The traditional tort textbook can leave the reader with a very misleading 
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 impression about how the compensation system operates in cases of personal injury.72 In 
practice, the system is transformed into something which has but a limited relationship to the 
theoretical picture portrayed. But it is not only the experience of practice which throws down a 
challenge to tort scholars: it is also changes to the basic rules themselves. These new rules 
undermine the tradition of awarding damages in a once-and-for-all lump sum, and expose the 
fragility of the conventional claim that the aim in tort is to return the claimant, in so far as 
possible, to the position enjoyed before the accident. As such they raise fundamental 
questions concerning the rationale and future direction of the law of tort. Who really pays, how 
much, and in what manner, are questions that will not go away.73 
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